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Abstract
Optimal wage indexation, as derived by Gray, was subject to criticismdue
to a lack of efficient use of information; failure to clear themarket which
resulted in non—optimal contracts; and the lack of an explicit use of welfare
criteria. The purpose of this paper is to derive a wage contract scheme that
is free from the above criticism, but is capable of preserving the insightof
Crayts analysis. In so doing the analysis reveals the role of costsof
information collection in a world characterized by incomplete information.
The analysis focuses also on the interaction between wage indexation and
costly information collection as alternative adjustment schemes.It is shown
that the first depends only on relative variances, whereas the second also
depends on aggregate volatility. The justification for labor contracts hinges
on the cost of information collection and last minute wage negotiation.
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It is well appreciated that an understanding of the structure of labor
contracts is a precondition for understanding adjustment to various macro—
policies. A labor contract that sets the money wage for a given period
introduces a short—run nominal wage rigidity. This rigidity implies that
price level changes affect real wage, inducing real effects in the short
run.1 In order to mitigate these effects, the contract might specify a
partial degree of wage indexation, and possibly also the conditions under
which wage re—negotiation would occur. The literature on wage contract
schemes has benefited from contributions by Gray (1976, 1978), Fischer (1977),
and others. However, their work has been subject to criticism due to a lack
of efficient use of information; failure to clear the labor market which
resulted in non—optimal contracts; and the lack of an explicit use of welfare
criteria.
As Barro (1977) and Karni (1983) have pointed out, these models were
presented in the context of complete current information. They failed to use
all available information, and as a result were challenged by the literature
on ratIonal expectations. Once a contract scheme uses all avaIlable Informa-
tion it will, as Barro (1977) and Karnl(1983)have indicated, dominate Gray's
scheme. These models also assumed that employment is demand determined, and,
as Cukierman (1980) has pointed Out, this assumption is arbitrary. Gray's
analysis derives optimal indexation from a loss function given by the output
volatility around its full information level.2 This is a useful shortcut, but
it is open to criticism due to the lack of explicit welfare justification.
The purpose of the current paper is to derive a wage contract scheme that
does not incur the above criticism, but is still capable of preserving the
insight of Gray's analysis. In deriving the scheme, the paper reveals the
—1—role of incomplete and costlyinformation.3 The framework for this analysis
is a monetary economy subject to random shocks. Observed pricesprovide only
partial information regarding the nature of thoseshocks. The current in-
formation set can be improved by costly data gathering. Supposethat at the
end of period t—1, a labor contract specifies the wage appliedfor period t.
It specifies also the degree of wage indexation, whichwill update the
contract wage according to the information provided bythe price signal at
period t. Because the price signal provides incompleteinformation, we might
benefit by allowing wage re—negotiation under certain conditions.The re-
negotiation will allow us to rewrite the contractfor period t using improved
information. Such information was nota known in the previous period(t—l),
and can be obtained only by costly information collection (surveys,etc.).
The problem analyzed in this paper is to decide ex—ante (atthe end of period
t—1) what weight the contract will allocate for each option.Such a decision
should involve cost—benefit considerations. The presumption isthat the
administrative cost of wage indexation is small relative to the costof
current information collection and wage re—negotiation.The paper applies
expected welfare criteria to designing the desired contractscheme. The
analysis does not address the role of risk sharing andinformation asymmetry
in deriving the contract scheme. These factors have been investigated by
Azariadis (1975), Baily (1977), Townsend (1982) and others. The current paper
does not negate the importance of these factors, rather demonstratesthat
information collection and negotiation costs suffice to derive wage contracts
in a welfare maximization setup.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives the desired degreeof
wage indexation and wage re—negotiation.Sectionsummarizes the findings.
The Appendix provides the notation used in the paper.
—2—2. The Model
Let us take a monetary economy where the labor supply is given by:
6
(1) L Q •(W/P)
where is the money wage and the price level at time t. Output is given
by
(2) Y Q' (L)h exp(v)
where v is a multiplicative productivity shock, and Lt the labor employed at
time t.




The demand for money balances Is gIven by:
(4) M =Y•P 'exp(—a 1E(1tIIt))
where E(It) is the conditional expectation operator, which corresponds to
the use of information available at period t(I), andiTt is the inflation
rate:
= — .
—3—Throughout the paper it is assumed that theinformation set at time
t(I) consists of the structureof the model, all variables dated t—1 and
earlier, and the current price level.
To simplify notation, let us neglect trends in allthe variables, assum-
ing that m and v are uncorrelated random variables,generated by white noise
processes:
x N(O,2) for xm,v.
As a reference point, we start with the 'non—stochasticequilibrium,"
i.e. ,theequilibrium in the economy if the value ofall the random shocks is
zero (v =m
0). Let us denote by a lowercase variable the percentage
deviation of the uppercase variable from its value in thenon—stochastic




the value of x if all the shocks are zero. To facilitate discussion,it is
useful to take a log—linear approximation of the model aroundits non
stochastic equilibrium, writing the model in termsofpercentage deviations.
This is equivalent to the use of a first order approximationof a Taylor
expansion around the equilibrium.4 From eq. 2 we getthat output at time tis
given by
(6) h i +




—4—where d1 ,and stands for the value of x in a flexible, full
information economy (x any variable). Denoting real wage byT,weget that
(8) taW_ptd+ .vt.
Employment and real wage depend positively on the productivity shock, and
are free from monetary considerations in a flexible, full information
equilibrium. The case of such an economy is used as a yardstick for the
analysis of a contracting economy. Under the labor contract, the wage for
period t is pre—set at the end of the previous period. The contract wage is
set at its expected money level in a flexible regime, given here by
E(WIIi). 1t1 stands for the information set at the end of t—1, which is
assumed to reflect known shocks (v_1, me_i). The contract we consider
contains two provisions that allow limited wage flexibility. First, it allows
partial indexation, at a rate of b, 0 < b < 1. Thus:
(9) log W log E(WII_i) + b[P —
orin a shorter notation
(9') wb 'Pt
where we denote by x' the value of x if the wage contract binds (xw,p,
etc.). The case b1 corresponds to a full indexation (real wage rigidity).
The case of bOcorrespondsto zero indexation (nominal wage rigidity). In
general, we expect 0 < b < 1, providing limited wage flexibility in the
contract scheme.
—5—Second, the contract specifies conditionsunder which re—negotiation will
occur. The purpose of re—negotiationis to update the contract according to
information that was unknown when the contract was setand is not reflected in
the current price level. A re—negotiation is costly.First, there might be
direct negotiation costs associated with last minute wagerevisions, denoted
by C. Next, there might be the real costof collecting the information
needed for the re—negotiation, denoted by C.To idel this case, suppose
that the current information set at t(I) includes onlythe price level, the
past shocks and the structure of themodel. At a real cost (Ci), the current
information set can be improved to include the valueof contemporaneous shocks
(nit,vt).
Let us denote the improved information set by
— {'' v}). If a decision is made to re—negotiate,it will imply
that resources are to be devoted to improving theinformation set, and the re-
negotiated wage will be based upon that set
Inthe case where the labor market does not clear, employmentis assumed
to be demand determined. As Cukierman (1980)has shown, this assumption is
arbitrary. The current paper demonstratesthat under an optimal wage scheme
the labor market clears. Thus this assumption is notrestrictive, in the
sense that alternative rules proposed byCukierman would yield the same
optimal wage contract scheme, resulting in clearingthe labor market. Let us
denote by x' the value of x if the wage contract binds,and x the value if
there is re—negotiation .Employmentis given by:
(10) i d1[E(vI) +p(1—b)1
(11) +d1t
—6—Notice that if the wage contract binds, employment will depend on the
perceived productivity shock E(vII)
6 andon monetary considerations that
might affect the price level t• In the case of re—negotiation,it is assumed
that the wage is set at its market —clearinglevel, which reflects the
improved information. Using eq. 10 and 11 get that output is given by:
(12) y —d2[(1—b)P
+E(vIIt)1+
(13) y —c; or
_d2
(14) t =d+ V + V —c
where c(C +C)/Y0 d h/(1—h).
Notice that in case of re—negotiation output deviates from its level in the
full information, flexible equilibrium by the adjustment costs (eq.
To complete the description of the labor contract, we should specify the
conditions under which re—negotiation is agreed to occur. A possible measure
describing the pressure towards re-negotiation is the perceIved real shock.
We define the re—negotiation pressure, denoted by ,as
(15) —E(vlI)
It is assumed that the contract specifies that if exceeds a threshold
value (k), re-negotiation will occur.8 As the analysis will demonstrate, the
expected welfare gain due to re—negotiation is proportional to (see
comment 11).In this sense, can be used as a measure of the re-
negotiation pressure. We can summarize the possible states of the economy by
—7—1' tif
(16)(y,l,t){ tt t',Tt)ifIl<k
If the wage contract binds, we get incomplete
information about the
shocks affecting the economy (mt, vt),





and V, stands for the variance of p'. Thus,for the case where the wage





—v)/El+ d2 p ÷ d2(1—b) + cZ
Eq.20 implies that observing the price level providesus with
informationregarding m —v.Thus:
(21) E(vlI) (m —v)
P
for p =— V/(V +V).Underthe wage contract the demand for laboris
given by eq.10, whereas the supplyis given by l (bl)p .Substituting
—8—for Pt (from eq. 17) we get:
(22) 1 —1
=g ;where gd1 +(1b)(d1
+'S)IP
Alternatively, wecan presenttheexcessdemand for labor as (see eq. 8,
10):
(22') l —1[E(;II) — Cd1
+ S)
Thus, under thecontractwage the excess demandforlabor is proportional
to the re—negotiation pressure (&). The factor of proportionality is g, and
E(tttI) is the market clearing wage. The labor contract described above
specifies two channels of adjustment: the degree of wage indexation (b) and
re—negotiation (k). The next section derives the optimal values of each.
3.The Optimal Contract Scheme
In order to derive the desired contract scheme, let us find the welfare
deviation from the reference case of a full information flexible economy under
a given contract. We denote this measure by WL. Because welfare in the case
of a full information, flexible economy is independent of the contract scheme,
we can derive optimal (k,b) by minimizing expected WL.
Under full information, the production of the contract output introduces
a welfare loss given by the triangle between the supply and demand of labor.
This loss can be approximated by
—9—(23) WL =q e2





If re—negotiation occurs, we get welfare loss(relative to the case of
full information) due to the adjustment cost:
(24) WL
c 'Y





The contract for period t is agreed at the endof t—1, and it specifies b
and k so as to minimize the expected welfare lossdue to the lack of full
information :
(26) Mm E(WLII_i).
Using eq. 12—14 we get that the contract output deviates from the
flexible, full information output by
(27) etd2[d+ + where




—10—Notice that is proportional to the forecast error of v. Therefore,
it is orthogonal to m —v,which is the observed information. On the other
hand, 8 is proportional to m —v.Thus, is orthogonal to Let us
denote by z the normalized value of k, i.e. z —k/a8
andZ'(z) and P(z) the
standard normal cumulative distribution and density function. Using the
orthogonality of8 and I we get that'°
(29) E(WLII_i)
d 2 2
q g2V8(1—24(z)'z —2$(—z))+q(d2)V (1—2(—z)) + 2Yc(—z)
1
This equation can be broken down into three components. The first term
represents the loss in expected welfare due to the non—clearing labor market
that results from the contract. The second term is the welfare loss due to
the lack of full information. Both terms apply for those circumstances in
which the wage contract binds. (I8I < k). The third term represents the
expected welfare loss due to adjustment costs in the case of re—negotiation,
and it applies for those circumstances in which > k. Notice that a more
frequent re—negotiation (dk < 0) reduces the first two terms, increasing the
third.
To gain further insight, consider figure 1. The two solid curves
represent the demand and supply of labor in a "non—stochastic" equilibrium.
Under shocks (vs, m.), the full information demand shifts upward by v, to
D'. Duetothe lack of full information, the perceived demand shifts upward
only by 8 E(vJI), to D. is the excess demand for labor resulting
from the contract wage (conditional on and q corresponds to the
welfare loss relative to the full information case, described by the shaded
—11-—area. The value of the real contract wage (ti)isaffected by the indexation
arrangement. The optimal policy should design an indexation scheme that will
equate the real contract wage (ti)tothe perceived equilibrium real wage
(E(;II)).
Optimal Indexation




There are two forces working towards setting optimal indexation. For a
monetary shock full indexation (b1) is desirable becasue it preserves the
real wage. For a real shock partial indexation (b +)isdesirable
because It will generate a real wage that is equal to the wage under a
flexible equilibrium. Optimal indexation Is set so as to balance those two
opposingforces according to their relative importance. Thus a higher Vm/Vv
implies a higher importance of monetaryshocks,pushing indexation upward.
Aggregate volatility, andthecost of information collection are not reflected
in optimal indexation because they do not affect therelativeImportance of
various shocks.
Optimalindexationis set so as to minimize the expected cost of the non—
clearingof the labor market (the first term in eq. 29). It is capable of
eliminating this cost completely (g"O for bb*). It is useful to note that b*
is equal to the indexation proposed by Gray. It is derived here, however, in
a framework where the use of information is optimal. The optimality is
reflectedin the fact that under the proposed scheme the labor market clears






Re—negotiationis desirable if the expected gain exceeds the cost
involved. Increase in aggregate volatility (a uniform increase in the
variance of all shocks) implies that the potential benefit more frequently
justifies re—negotiation (eq. 33b). This is because the cost of lack of full
—13—
resources in information collecting and re—negotiation.
Optimal re—negotiation
We now consider the possibility of government regulation of contract
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<0information increases monotonicallywith aggregate volatility. This works as
to increase the benefit of re—negotiation,which sets the wage according to
the improved information set. Naturally, ahigher cost of information
collection or last minute re—negotiationreduces the desirability of re-
negotiation. Notice that if the adjustmentcost Cc) is small relative to the
variance of the real shock forecast error(c Y0 < q(d2)2 V1) we get k* —0,
nullifying the role of pre—set wage contracts.In such a case, all trades
take place in spot markets. To gain furtherinsight into the determination of
optimal information collection andre—contracting, let us consider how
increasing the frequency of re—negotiationaffects expected welfare. This is
done by deriving the expected marginal costand benefit of lowering
z(z— k/c7). The expected cost of re—negotiationand information collection
is given by the third term in eq. 29. Thus,the expected marginal cost is:
(34) MCmyc •(2 4(z)).
The expected benefit of re—negotiation andinformation collection is given by
the first two terms in eq. 29. Thus, expectedmarginal benefit is
2g z2
(35) MBq •(d2)d1 +
.
V8+V1) •2 4Kz).
The expected marginal benefit and cost canbe broken down into the marginal
benefit and marginal cost weighted by the changein the probability of re-
negotiation resulting from d(—z) (i.e.24(z)). Figure 2 plots the
unweighted marginal cost and marginalbenefit (MC/(2'P);MBI(21)).13 z
corresponds to the optimal re—negotiation.To shaded area weighted by the
marginal probability (2$), corresponds tothe welfare gain attributed to
—14—information collection and re—negotiation. Higher cost c results in an upward
shift of the marginal cost curve, implying less frequent re—negotiation.
Higher aggregate volatility (dVm > 0 for a given VmIVv) shifts the marginal
benefit up, encouraging re—negotiation.
Starting with an economy where wage indexation is prohibited, allowing a
limited indexation has the effect of reducing g0.In terms of figure 2, it
shifts the marginal benefit curve to the right, which in turn reduces the
frequency of re—negotiation. In this sense, wage re—negotiation and wage
indexationare substitutes for each other. Allowing for unregulated wage
indexation will result in setting optimal indexatlon at b*, which in turn
implies that the marginal benefit curve is given by the flat dotted line in
figure 2.
Consequently, in a covarlance stationary economy free from regulations
regarding wage indexation, re—negotiation agreements and contracts with
optimal indexation are mutually exclusive regimes. Wage contracts with
optimal indexation dominates re—negotiation if and only if the cost of
information collection and re—negotiation is large relative to a volatility
measure:
d2 V •V
(36) c>--—( 2) •
m V
Yd + V +V
o 1 m v
The relevant volatility measure is the variance of the real shock
forecast error (V). If the above condition does not hold, continuous re-
negotiation will dominate a contract regime. In such a case the labor market
behaves as a spot market. In both regimes, the labor market clears
continuously. If eq. 36 is satisfied, any regulation which prevents the use
of optimal indexation (b*) gives rise to the simultaneous use of re—
—15—negotiation and wage contracts; and willoccasionally imply disequilibrium in
the labor market.
Notice that an unexpected change in the covariancestructure can result
in a transitory period in which we use a wageindexatlon that was optimal in a
previous regime. In such a case, we might geta transitory disequilibrium in
the labor market, resulting from an unstablecovariance structure. It should
be noted, however, that allowing for the adjustmentcosts of learning the new
structure might preserve the market clearingstructure in an extended model.
Its formulation is left for future study.
4. concluding Remarks
This paper has focused on how costly informationcollection and costly
last minute wage negotiation affect the flexibilityof wage contracts. It
considers the case where a wage contract allowsfor limited flexibility by
specifing partial wage indexation and theconditions under which wage re-
negotiation will occur. The economyis subject to random shocks. Observed
prices provide only partial information
regarding the nature of those
shocks. The current information set can be improvedby costly data gatheridg
(surveys, research, etc.). Indexationmakes use of the information embodied
in the price signal, whereas wage re—negotiation
make use of the information
that can be obtained only by costly research.The analysis derives the
contract scheme which will minimize thewelfare loss due to imperfect
information at the time of the contract negotiation.A higher volatility in
the shocks affecting the economy has theeffect of increasing wage re-
negotiation, whereas a higher cost ofinformation collection reduces it. Wage
indexation proves to depend on measures ofrelative (and not absolute)
volatility of the various shocks. It is notaffected by the cost of
—16—information collection. Wage indexation increases with the importance of
monetary, relative to real, disturbances. It is the same as the indexation
scheme proposed by Gray, but it is derived in a setup which uses all available
information, resulting in a clearing labor market. The final justification
for labor contracts with optimal wage re—negotiation hinges on the cost of
information collection and last minute wage negotiation.
tn a covariance stationary economy, free from regulation regarding wage
indexation, re—negotiation agreements and contracts with optimal indexacion
are mutually exclusive regimes. Wage contracts with optimal indexation
dominates re—negotiation if (and only if) the cost of information collection
and re—negotiation is large relative to a volatility measure.If this
condition does not hold the labor market behaves as a spot market. If this
condition is satisfied, any regulation which prevents the use of optimal
indexation gives rise to the simultaneous use of re—negotiation and wage
contracts.
Comments
1. For studies that emphasize these effects see, for example, Fischer
(1977) and Taylor (1979).
2. Flood and Marion (1982) and Marston (1982) use such a loss function to
derive optimal wage policy in an open economy. Aizenman (1982) applies
this loss function to derive optimal wage re—negotiation. The above
studies use a modified version of models used by Gray (1976) and Fischer
(1977).
3. In some respects, this paper can be viewed as extending Barro's (1977)
analysis for the case of costly and incomplete information.
—17—4. It is assumed that the variances of theshocks are small enough to make
suchan approximation useful.
5. To simplify exposition, it is assumedthat investment in improving the
information set is found in conjunction withre—negotiation. Modifying
this assumption will not change the natureof the results reported in
the paper. This is because the onlyobservable current information is
the price level. Optimal indexation allows usto use this information
efficiently. Therefore, re—negotiation can improvewelfare only if it
is based upon information that is notcontained in the price signal.
Thus, investment in information must accompanyre—negotiation. If the
costs of re—negotiation are high relativeto the costs of information
collection, we expect investment in informationto precede the decision
related to re—negotiation. Modeling such a sequence canbe added
without difficulty and without affecting themain results.
6. This is because the producer demands labor such asto equate product
wage with the perceived marginal product.Because he does not observe
he uses E(vlI).
7. The cost c is assumed not to affect the marginal productof labor. Thus
—cis a logarithm-ic approximation of the outputaround the non—
stochastic equilibrium.
8. A related analysis of a price adjustment ndelis developed in Barro
(1972).
9.Because of lack of full information, the bestthat we can do is to use
the information available at thecontract negotiation time (In_i).




11. For a known value of the expected benefit form re—negotiation is:
d 2
E(q eII) q(+)I () +
It is proportional to i3 .Thus, can be used as a measure of
re—negotiation pressure.
12. k* —0if the expression in the squareroot is negative.
13.Figure 2 corresponds to the assumption that c > q(d2)2 V1
—19--Appendix Notation
Uppercase variables denotelevels, lowercase letters denotethe
logarithmic deviation of the uppercasevariable from the "non—stochastic
equilibrium."







—informationset at time t
E(xIIt)
expected value of x, conditional on
X0





b —thedegree of wage indexation
x the value of x in a flexible, fullinformation equilibrium.
x' thevalue of x if the wage contract binds.
x — thevalue of x if the wage is re—negotiated
variance of x
(z), (z) a thestandard normal cumulative and densityfunctions.
=labor/wagesupply elasticity
—20—h —output/laborsupply elasticity
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